Comment on the European Parliament Draft Report on the proposal for a recovery and resolution directive : (Rapporteur: Gunnar Hökmark)

– Doc 2012/0150 (COD) of 11 October 2012 – by Krahnen, Jan Pieter
 
   





Policy Platform ■ House of Finance ■ Goethe-Universität Frankfurt ■ Grüneburgplatz 1 ■ D-60323 Frankfurt am Main  
Phone: +49(0)69 798-33684 ■ www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform 

































Comment on the European 
Parliament Draft Report 
on the proposal for a recovery and 
resolution directive  
(Rapporteur: Gunnar Hökmark) 
– Doc 2012/0150 (COD) of 11 October 2012 – 
 
Jan Pieter Krahnen 





Comment on the European Parliament Draft Report on the proposal 
for a recovery and resolution directive  
(Rapporteur: Gunnar Hökmark) 





, Goethe Universität Frankfurt, Germany 
This present comment suggests an amendment to the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, establishing a framework for the recovery 
and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The current proposal 
focuses on bail-in, but does not sufficiently take into account the pressure exerted on 
central bankers, supervisors and politicians by the fear of interbank contagion. The 
only way out of this hold-up type of situation can be found in bail-in bonds. Bail-in 
bonds are dedicated loss taking debt instruments, whose status of being first in line if 
it comes to default is clearly communicated from day one.  
The suggestions for dedicated bail-in bonds is one of the main proposals contained in 
the Liikanen Report (dated October 2, 2012)
2
The high degree of potential contagion between banks is a recent development. It has 
been caused by the rise of interconnection between financial institutions, which in 
turn is caused by direct interbank lending, by derivatives exposures between banks, 
and by an increased level of asset correlation and ensuing liquidity risk.  
. The Liikanen Report makes the 
resolvability of banks the key challenge for structural regulatory reform. The report 
argues that without a proper mechanism to wind down troubled banks, including the 
largest ones, the taxpayer will always be forced to intervene, and to ensure bank 
system stability.  
For any solution of the too-big-to-fail and the too-interconnected-to-fail problem to be 
effective, the contagion between banks has to be reduced significantly. More 
precisely, for bank resolution to function properly when a particular bank is in 
trouble, the supervisory agency entrusted with a restructuring mandate must be able to 
act without fearing the collapse of the financial system at large. 
Consider the bail-out cases witnessed during the past 5 years in several European 
countries, including the UK, NL, B, GER. In almost all cases the bail-out (i.e. the use 
of taxpayer money) was justified ex-post by the imminence of default contagion in the 
banking system. Press reports have stressed the role of contagion risk in discussions 
among supervisors as the main argument for the unavoidability of bail-outs.  
The willingness of central bankers and supervisors to bail out banks by the use of 
public money must, of course, be seen against the background of the Lehman collapse 
in 2008, and the lesson it holds for posterity. This lesson was simply this: do not 
underestimate the intensity of bank interconnection in today’s banking markets.  
What is the lesson to be learned from this experience for the regulator? The Liikanen 
Report draws two important conclusions in this regard: First, increase bank 
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resolvability by limiting the influence of short term exposures from banks’ trading 
books (separate banking proposal). Second, make some bank debt (bail-in debt) 
contagion-free by enforcing a holding ban on bail-in debt for all banks.  
The second point is an important advancement of the bail-in proposal included in the 
current draft of the RRD. In the current version of the RRD, bail-in is rightly 
positioned in the core of the proposal. Through an effective bail-in mechanism, the 
tax-payer can be spared of bank rescues, except for the most extreme systemic crises.  
However, the current proposal, though it focuses on bail-in, does not consider 
sufficiently the pressure exerted on central bankers, supervisors and politicians by the 
fear of interbank contagion. The only way out of this hold-up type of situation can be 
found in bail-in bonds. Bail-in bonds are dedicated loss taking debt instruments, 
whose status of being first in line if it comes to default is clearly communicated from 
day one.  
Investors in bail-in bonds thus know the risky nature of their investment, and the 
market is able to price these instruments accordingly. The coupon of bail-in bonds 
will be significantly higher than that of other debt instruments. An important covenant 
of bail-in bonds is the holding ban. Other banks are not allowed to invest into bail-in 
bonds. This effectively reduces the risk of default risk contagion. Put differently, the 
holding ban renders the pre-announced bail-in credible, since supervisors need not 
fear contagion risk for bail-in debt. 
An important question relates to the size of the bail-in debt layer, and the existence of 
investor demand. While the Liikanen proposal has left the calibration of the size of 
the bail-in debt layer to the Commission, a likely size of the bail-in debt layer is about 
5% of total assets. Based on average equity capital in the banking system, a 5% debt 
layer would roughly double the size of contagion-free loss absorption capacity in the 
banking system.  
We have no hard evidence on investor demand for such a new class of bail-in bank 
debt. The experience of Credit Suisse, however, suggests that there is strong demand 
for this type of debt (CS’ primary issue of bail-in debt in the form of coco bonds was 
ten times oversubscribed). Nevertheless, to allow a market for bail-in bonds to 
develop properly, a 5+ year build-up period is highly recommended (phasing-in). 
There are further ways to ease the acceptance of bail-in bonds by the market. E.g., 
clearly defined trigger rules (as in the case of the new Swiss bail-in regulation), or 
allowing bail-in bonds to differ by seniority. 
 
 